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This  paper  conducts  an  empirical  investigation  of  wage  differentials  and  theories  of  wage
determination for the Chilean economy. Competitive and efficiency wage theories of the labor
market are examined and their implications for the existence of wage differentials are discussed.
The investigation reveals the existence of statistically significant interindustrial wage differentials,
and shows the consistency of their patterns across time, occupations, and firm size. It is not only
the existence of wage differentials but also the regularities of their patterns that are particularly
difficult to reconcile with a competitive explanation.  Wages inside a firm are highly correlated
across occupations, lending support to the hypothesis that equity considerations matter in wage
determination. In agreement with other studies on wage differentials, the paper finds that high
paying industries comprise large, capital-intensive firms, which are highly concentrated and earn
above average profits.  The extent to which this relation between wage differentials  and  firm
characteristics supports efficiency wage  models  is  discussed.    In  short,  the  behavior  of  the
Chilean labor market poses a number of questions for the competitive hypothesis. The results of
this research are consistent with the predictions of efficiency wage models.
RESUMEN
Este estudio realiza una investigación empírica sobre el tema de diferenciales de salario y teorías
de determinación de salarios, analizando el caso específico de la economía chilena durante el
período 1937-1987. El estudio examina tanto teorías competitivas, como teorías de salarios de
eficiencia, y discute la relevancia de ambas en la explicación de los diferenciales de salarios.  La
investigación revela la existencia de diferenciales de  salario  estadísticamente  significativos,  y
demuestra  la  consistencia  del  patrón  de  dichos  diferenciales  a  través  del  tiempo,  entre
ocupaciones y firmas de distinto tamaño. Tanto la existencia de diferenciales de salario, como sus
regularidades, son difíciles de reconciliar con explicaciones competitivas de determinación de los
salarios.  En  particular,  los  salarios  al  interior  de  las  empresas  muestran  ser  altamente
correlacionados, evidencia que  apoya  la  hipótesis  de  que  consideraciones  de  equidad  son
importantes en el proceso de determinación de las remuneraciones. En forma similar  a  otros
estudios, encontramos que las industrias con elevados salarios relativos se caracterizan por estar
compuestas por firmas de gran tamaño, intensivas en capital, con alto grado de concentración y
utilidades superiores al promedio industrial. El estudio discute hasta que punto  esta  relación
entre diferenciales de salario y características de la firma, apoya las hipótesis de los modelos de
salarios  de  eficiencia.    En  resumen  nuestro  estudio  demuestra  que  el  comportamiento  del
mercado laboral chileno, en el período analizado, cuestiona la hipótesis de un comportamiento
competitivo de dicho mercado. Por el contrario, los resultados de la investigación apoyan  las
predicciones de los modelos de salarios de eficiencia.INTRODUCTION
This  investigation  relates  to  the  question  of  why  workers  with  apparently  identical
characteristics receive different wages across firms and industries.  As we will see this is a question
that has a long tradition in economics and has received greater  attention  lately,  especially  in
developed countries.  Our concern is with the behavior of LDCs’ economies, and in particular with
the Chilean labor market.
The  paper  examines  the  existence  of  interindustrial  wage  differentials,  their  pattern
across occupations and time, and inquires into the factors determining such differentials.  The
objective is to bring new insights to bear on the pattern of the Chilean wage structure and the
factors that could explain such behavior.  In particular, the investigation confronts competitive vs.
efficiency  theories  of  wage  determination.    An  investigation  of  the  determinants  of  wage
differentials has implications that reach beyond the traditional concern with income distribution
policies.  The debate between competitive and efficiency wage models (EWMs) points to different
interpretations of the relationship between wages and unemployment and implications for the role
of macroeconomic and industrial policies.
The plan of this paper is as follows:
Sections I and II set the theoretical background for our analysis.  Section I presents an
overview  of  the  wage  differentials  literature,  both  for  developed  economies  and  for  Latin
American countries.  After the evolution of the literature has been addressed do we turn to the
theoretical explanations.  The reason is that in spite of the fact that empirical wage differential
estimations have a long tradition in economics, only recently has an effort been made to provide
more formal theoretical explanations for such behavior.  Therefore, section II presents a review of
recent theories of wage  determination  explaining  the  existence  of  wage  differentials,  giving
special emphasis to efficiency wage models.
The following two sections deal with the empirical results of our investigation.  Section III
presents the estimation of interindustrial wage differentials and the examination of their pattern
across time, firm sizes, and occupations.  In Section  IV  we  relate  the  wage  structure  to  the
industrial characteristics that seem to explain wage differentials.  Finally, section V addresses the
main conclusions of this research.I.  STUDIES OF INTERINDUSTRIAL WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
This section reviews studies  dealing  with  interindustrial  wage  differential  estimations.
Given that most of the empirical research has been conducted for the US economy, the first
section, which addresses the most important literature about the subject, largely refers to this
country.  In section I.2 we  discuss  the  state  of  the  research  on  wage  differentials  for  Latin
American economies.
1.  A Review of the Basic Literature
The dispersion of wages across industries for workers in apparently identical occupations
is by now a well documented fact.  The existence of interindustrial wage differentials was first
emphasized in the early fifties in the work of Dunlop, Slichter,  Lester,  and  other  institutional
economists.  One early reference indicating the existence of wage dispersion was provided by
Dunlop  (1957),  showing  large  variance  of  average  wages  for  truck  drivers,  ranging  from  a
maximum of $2.25 to a minimum of $1.20 across industries.
These early investigations not only showed the existence of high earnings dispersion but
also provided initial insights into the existence of a pattern of wage differentials.  In a study that is
now a classic reference, Slichter (1950) found high correlations across occupations and stable
wage differentials over time for the US economy.  The stability of the wage structure for the US
economy was further advanced by a study carried out by Cullen (1956).  These early studies on
wage  differentials  emphasized  the  demand  side  of  the  labor  market,  focusing  on  industrial
characteristics influencing the wage structure.
The studies  on  wage  differentials  carried  out  during  the  sixties  and  early  seventies
followed the same line of research.  The studies by Rapping (1967), Masters (1969), and Kumar
(1972),  among  others,  focused  on  estimating  the  effects  on  the  average  industrial  wage
dispersion of several industrial characteristics, such as profits, degree of concentration, union
density, and the size of the firm. 
During  the  seventies,  the  development  of  the  human  capital  model  changed  labor
research  emphasis  toward  supply  aspects.    A  countless  number  of  studies  analyzed  the
importance of an individual’s occupation, experience, and other human capital variables in income
determination.  This type of research was also conducted extensively in LDCs.
The development of the human capital model and access to better data sources made
possible the rise of a new generation of wage differentials studies during  the  seventies  and
eighties.  These studies used individual earnings as the  dependent  variable  and  tested  thesignificance of industrial variables in wage equations that include controls for differences in worker
characteristics.  For example, Dalton and Ford (1977) and Long and Link (1983) found that market
power—measured by concentration  variables—had  a  positive  significant  relation  with  wages.
Freeman and Medoff (1981) found that industry average firm size raised wages of both union and
nonunion workers.  Dunn (1986) also asserted a positive relation between firm size and wages,
one that was not explained by compensating wage differentials only.
However,  research  focusing  on  the  relation  between  wage  dispersion  and  industry
characteristics lacked a formal model for explaining such facts.  A number of studies, especially
those related to market power and ability to pay, loosely based their hypotheses on some sort of
bargaining model where high wages were driven by a combination of a firm’s market power and
trade union pressure.  Nevertheless, this is restrictive and not a general model, given that wage
differentials persisted for both union and nonunion workers.
In spite of the lack of a full-fledged model, several theoretical insights were provided by
the  studies  that  correlated  wages  with  industrial  characteristics.    For  example,  the  relation
between monitoring cost, firm size, and wage differentials was advanced by Lester (1967), and
Stigler (1962) suggested the hypothesis that the process of selecting workers was most costly in
large firms.  As we will see many of these ideas were later integrated into efficiency wage models.
In short, these studies showed that in the US economy workers in large firms received
higher wages, that a firm’s ability to pay had a positive influence on wage differentials  across
industries, and that industry union density was positively correlated to the earnings of union and
nonunion workers.1  Also, in some studies capital-labor ratios had a positive relationship with
wages.  However, these investigations are subject to the critique that most results are highly
sensitive to the wage equation specification chosen by the researcher, a fact that considerably
limits the generalization of their conclusions.2
New interest in the topic of wage differentials sprang up again in recent years, with the
studies by Krueger and Summers (1987, 1988), Dickens and Katz (1987a, 1987b), and Groshen
(1986).    What  is  distinctive  about  the  recent  generation  of  empirical  studies  is  both  their
methodology and theoretical background.  In terms of methodology they provide new tests for
the existence of interindustrial and establishment wage differentials and for the regularities of their
patterns, using improved econometric techniques and extensive  controls  for  worker  and  job
characteristics.  On the other hand, they use as theoretical background the efficiency models of
wage determination, models that provide a new rationale for the existence of wage differentials.
                                    
1 Dickens  and  Katz  (1987a)  and  Groshen  (1986)  present  excellent  reviews  of  the  wage
differentials literature that correlates wage dispersion with firm and industrial characteristics.
2  See Dickens and Katz (1987a).As we  will  discuss  extensively  later  on,  efficiency  wage  models  (EWMs)  predict  the
existence of wage differentials as an equilibrium solution in models  where  firms  and  workers
optimize their behavior; those models do not rest on the assumptions that firms are oligopolist and
wages are subject to collective bargaining.
The existence of wage differentials is confirmed by the Krueger and Summers, Dickens
and Katz, and Groshen studies, that found workers with identical characteristics receiving different
wages across industries.  However, it is not only the existence of wage dispersion but also the
regularities of their patterns that provide support for the EWMs.  In fact, the studies mentioned
found that wage differentials are stable across time and countries, and highly correlated across
occupations and firm sizes.
In short, the recent empirical research on wage differentials in the  US  is  seen  as  an
attempt to confront competitive vs. efficiency models  of  wage  determination,  a  fact  that  has
broadened the implications of wage differentials studies, given the different policy implications of
the underlying theories.  In  other  words,  the  new  studies  address  the  extent  to  which  the
existence of wage differentials challenges the hypothesis of a competitive labor market.
2.  Studies of Wage Differentials for Latin American Economies
This section presents a review of selected investigations that deal with the issue of wage
differentials for Latin America.  There are two type of studies that one should distinguish.  First the
ones that analyze the relation between development and the wage structure, and secondly case
studies of wage differentials for particular countries.
The following are some of the predominant hypotheses concerning the relation between
wage structure and development:
a. “Wage  dispersion  tends  to  reach  a  maximum  sometime  during  the  early
stages  of  industrialization,  and  to  diminish  gradually  after  that  point”
(Reynolds and Taft, 1956).
b. There are “smaller interindustry differentials in a country with a lower level of
industrialization than in a highly industrialized one, due to differences in the
degree of skill and product market differentiation between the two type of
countries”  (Dunlop,  1957,  pp.  25-6).    In  the  same  sense,  Krueger  and
Summers, (1987) have pointed out that LDCs’ economies may have a lower
dispersion of wages than more developed  countries,  because  their  labor
force presents a lower level of human capital.
c. The pattern of wage differentials is very similar across developed countries.
However, the interindustry wage structure patterns of LDCs tend to  differ
from the developed ones, and also tend to differ among themselves (Papola
and Bharadwaj, 1970).  Krueger and  Summers  (1987)  conjecture  that  as
countries become more developed their industrial wage structures tend to
converge.With  respect  to  the  country  studies,  it  must  be  noticed  that  there  are  in  fact  few
investigations dealing directly with the issue of wage differentials; most of them cover the general
subject  of  the  determinants  of  worker  earnings.    Also,  the  relation  between  industrial
characteristics and wage differentials often arises only as an extension in studies that focus on
estimating the human capital model.
The fact that research on wage differentials in LDCs is more dispersed and more difficult
to track down makes a review of the available literature particularly useful.  Table 1 presents a
summary of selected studies  that  deal—in  a  general  sense—with  wage  differentials  in  Latin
American economies.
One of the investigations that more directly address the topic of wage differentials in Latin
America, is Ferreira da Silva’s (1987) study for Brazil.  He found that the main determinants of
earnings  were  the  individual  worker’s  characteristics,  but  that  firm,  industry,  and  regional
characteristics were also  significant,  after  controlling  for  human  capital  variables.    Fields  and
Marulanda (1976) found that for the Colombian manufacturing sector higher  (average)  wages
were associated with more capital-intensive sectors, with high foreign investment, and larger firms.
Macedo (1985) investigates a special aspect of the wage relation, i.e., wage differentials between
private and public firms in Brazil.  His results show that higher wages are paid in the public sector,
even  after  controlling  for  worker  characteristics.    However,  the  general  applicability  of  his
conclusion  is  not  very  strong,  since  the  results  with  human  capital  controls  refer  only  to  a
comparison between two firms.
Other studies examine the influence of  industrial  attributes  on  wages,  but  mainly  as
extensions (control-variables) in human capital type models.  In Castello Branco (1979) the degree
of concentration has a positive effect on the average industrial wage for Brazil.  Salazar Carrillo
(1982) finds a nonsignificant effect for size of firm on individual earnings; however, these results
must be affected by the small sample size variance.
In general, most of the studies for Latin America emphasize the importance of the human
capital variables.  The correlation coefficient (R2) from standard human capital estimates ranged
between 40% to 50%, far higher than for the US economy.  This is a well-documented result forLDCs, related to their higher schooling variance.  The fact that human capital variables are a main
determinant  of  worker  earnings  is  seen  in  some  of  these  studies  as  a  confirmation  of  the
predominance of the neoclassical-competitive model.  However, we could argue that this is not
the right test.  The importance of human capital variables is an unquestionable fact in any model of
the labor market, however it is not a market clearing test.
In contrast to human capital theory based studies, other researchers  focused  on  the
segmentation hypothesis.  They test this hypothesis through comparisons of earning equations
across labor market segments and industrial sectors.  Souza and Tokman (1978), in an analysis of
three Latin American countries, found that workers in the formal sector earn  40%  more  than
workers with similar characteristics in the informal sector, and that the size of establishment has a
positive effect on individual wages.  Uthoff (1983), in an analysis of the Chilean labor market,
classified the individuals in two labor market segments, formal and informal, and estimated human
capital type equations.3 His results indicate that the wage determination process differs between
sectors.
In  what  concerns  us  most,  there  are  studies  that  have  tested  segmentation  across
industrial sectors for the Chilean economy, in fact  testing  for  wage  differentials.    Corbo  and
Stelcner (1983) found that the human capital model had a high explanatory power for individual
wages dispersion and no differences in earning equations across industrial sectors (Chow test).
They concluded that there was no evidence of segmentation and that their results validated the
hypothesis of the competitiveness of the Chilean labor market.  Their results have been criticized
on the basis that their  sample  data  biased  the  results  against  the  segmentation  hypothesis
(Uthoff, 1981).  An investigation carried out by Riveros (1983) corroborated Corbo and Stelcner’s
conclusions, in the sense of obtaining equivalent statistical results.  His results have also been
under debate on the basis that alternative tests—with the same data—lend support to opposite
conclusions (Romaguera, 1986).
Edwards and Edwards (1987) refer to another type of segmentation in the Chilean labor
market, i.e., between protected, covered by the minimum wage law, and unprotected sectors.
The earning equation differs across the three segments, for the period 1974-80.  They attribute
the wage differentials to the influence of  unions  (prior  to  1973),  differentials  that  were  later
perpetuated by the indexation mechanism.
                                    
3 The  criteria  for  being  informal  were:  self-employed  workers  with  less  than  13  years  of
education, temporary workers, employers, and family workers in firms with less than 5 employees,
and domestic service. In the formal sector all other classifications were included, covering all the
blue and white collar workers, since his data base did not identify size of firm.Finally,  there  are  studies  that  deal  with  the  issue  of  wage  differentials  from  other
perspectives.  For example, Reyes Heroles (1984) examines the effect of modernization on the
wage structure.
Summarizing, the studies dealing with development and the wage structure hypothesize
that LDCs should have a lower wage dispersion than developed economies and a less similar
wage structure.  The case studies have found similar evidence to the earlier investigation for the
US economy, in the sense that high paying industries are large and capital intensive.  However a
greater  role  is  assigned  in  some  of  these  studies  to  human  capital  explanations  of  wage
dispersion.
In general, there has been little concern in the Latin American literature with examining
the  pattern  of  wage  dispersion  and  the  implications  of  wage  differentials  for  nonclearing
interpretations of the labor market.  The exceptions are studies that are currently being conducted
for  Venezuela  and  Uruguay.4  The  present  research—together  with  the  above  mentioned
studies—constitutes an attempt to fill this gap and bring new insights on the determinants of
wages in Latin American economies.
II.  THEORIES OF WAGE DETERMINATION:
WHY DO WAGE DIFFERENTIALS EXIST?
In the previous section we briefly reviewed empirical studies of wage differentials.  As we
stated in that section, the research that has been conducted lately, both for developed and less
developed countries, is concerned with the extent to which the existence of wage differentials
discriminates between competitive and noncompetitive theories of the labor market.
In this section we review competitive and noncompetitive theories of wage determination
that attempt to explain the existence of wage differentials, giving special emphasis to efficiency
wage models.  A basic difference between both groups of theories rests on the hypothesis that
wages do, or fail to, adjust in order to clear the labor market.
1.  The Competitive Model
The neoclassical interpretation of wage differentials emphasizes two aspects  of  wage
behavior.    Since  labor  demand  is  determined  by  the  value  of  the  marginal  product,  wage
differentials must correspond to  productivity  differentials.    A  second  argument  refers  to  the
competitive hypothesis:  free market forces will ensure that labor of the same quality will be paid
the same wage.
                                    
4  See Márquez (1988) and Abuhadba (1988).However, a  number  of  studies  have  found  a  pattern  of  persistent  and  stable  wage
differentials.  The crucial question is then, what explains these wage differentials?
There are basically three types of consideration under which wage differentials remain
consistent  with  a  competitive  interpretation  of  the  labor  market:    transitory  differences,
compensating  differentials,  and  unmeasured  labor  quality.    The  last  two  are  related  to
measurement problems.
In the first place, changes in labor demand could produce transitory wage differentials for
equally productive workers, differentials that will tend to narrow over time as the labor  market
returns to equilibrium.  A second explanation focuses on compensating differentials that arise as
higher wages are needed to compensate workers for job attributes of the industry.  In this case
wage differentials are essentially a measurement error, since the comparison does not take into
account differences in nonpecuniary costs of worker employment.  Finally, wage differentials may
reflect the existence of unmeasured labor characteristics.  These differentials could arise because
different industries employ different technologies, which in turn are sensitive to worker ability in
different degrees.  The differential ability is known by the worker and the firm but is unobserved by
the econometrician.
An alternative explanation is that the competitive model is  prevented  from  prevailing,
owing to external imposed rigidities.  This is the view of some Chilean economists who perceive
wage differentials as arising from the role of unions and government regulations, such as minimum
wages and wage indexation (see previous section).
2.  Efficiency Wage Models5
a)  The Basic Model
The essential feature of efficiency wage models (EWMs) is the hypothesis that worker
productivity is a positive function of wages, at least over some relevant range.  Therefore, firms
may be reluctant to reduce wages in the face of excess supply, since the associated decrease in
productivity may result in an increase in labor costs.  There are different hypotheses to explain the
link between wages and productivity which give rise to alternative efficiency models.
A crucial assumption in all the models is the dual role played by the wage rate.  In the
neoclassical model wages perform only an allocative job, i.e., equating supply and demand for
labor.  In all the EWMs wages play an additional role, which varies depending on the model’s
assumptions.  Wages affect worker behavior by affecting physical productivity in the nutritional
                                    
5  There are a number of excellent reviews of the efficiency wage theories, and this section is
partially based on them.  See Katz (1986), Yellen (1984), Stiglitz (1986), Carmichel (1987), and
Lang and Kahn (1988).model, by affecting work effort in the shirking model, or by affecting morale in  the  normative
models.  Wages also determine the quality of the labor hiring pool in the adverse selection model,
or the probability of acceptance of a firm’s employment offer in the recruitment model.  The dual
role played by the wage rate is at the core of the nonclearing results obtained by these models.
In its simplest form, the efficiency wage hypothesis can be summarized by a production
function of the form:
Q = f (e(w) L) , e’(w) > 0 [1]
where L is the number of workers, w is the real wage and e is the effort per worker, or more
general, worker productivity.
EWMs have been mostly developed as explanations of involuntary unemployment, but
they also provide a justification for wage dispersion.  If the effort function differs across firms then
firms’ optimal wages will also differ, and in equilibrium wage differentials will arise.
b)  Alternative Efficiency Wage Models
There are different types of EWMs:  the nutritional model; models that involve what in the
literature has been called a “malfeasance,” such as shirking, turnover, adverse selection, and
recruiting  models;  and  the  sociological  models.    The  nutritional  model  originated  in  the
development literature, applied to LDCs, and can be  considered  a  pioneer  efficiency  wages
model.  The models that involve a “malfeasance” are the ones that have been most developed in
the literature and some of them express in a more formal setup hypotheses previously advanced
in the institutional literature on wage differentials.  Finally, the sociological or normative models
bring into the analysis social considerations about workers behavior.  A brief discussion of these
models follows.
i)        Nutritional               Model
The  earliest  efficiency  wage  model  was  originated  in  the  development  literature  by
Leibenstein (1957).  He advanced the idea that under certain circumstances it will benefit the
landowner to pay a wage above the competitive level.  The reason is the existence of a neglected
relationship  between  wages  and  productivity,  i.e.,  the  amount  of  workers’  effort  depends
positively on their wage.  The linkage between higher wages and greater effort is related to health
and  nutrition  under  the  hypothesis  that  in  poor  economies  wages  determine  workers
consumption levels.
The focus of the nutritional model on rural sectors and on the relation between wages and
consumption seemed more adequate for rural poor countries, thus reducing the generalization ofthe model.  However, in many Latin American countries very low wage levels in some sectors of
the economy are found, e.g., wages that are below poverty line estimations.
There are a number of studies that attempted to test the nutritional model in LDCs.  The
results of such investigations vary from rather inconclusive results, such as those of Inmink and
Viteri (1981), to weak support, as in Bliss and Stern (1978), to strong support for the model, as in
Rodgers (1975) and Audibert (1986).
ii)        Shirking              Model    
The shirking model is the one that has been most extensively developed in the literature.
See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Calvo (1985), Sparks (1986), and Bulow and Summers (1986),
among others.  The model assumes that workers have some discretion concerning their work
performance and that there are costs associated with monitoring, or that monitoring is imperfect.
In order to induce workers’ good behavior and discourage shirking, a firm needs to pay above the
market clearing wage, to a point where the wage premium raises the cost of being laid off.  The
shirking model adds new variables to equation [1]; now the firm’s effort function depends on the
average wage, the aggregate unemployment and the unemployment benefit.
The shirking model predicts that firms that pay high wages are those with high monitoring
costs, significant possibilities for workers to vary their effort inputs, and high costs from shirking,
such as expensive broken machinery (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).  Another hypothesis derived
from this model is that a firm should pay a higher “premium” to occupations in which poor worker
performance can cause larger damage to the firm.
The shirking model has been criticized because  the  same  results  (deterred  shirking)
could  be  obtained  by  means  other  than  firms  paying  high  wages,  e.g.  workers  posting
performance  bonds  which  are  forfeited  if  the  worker  is  caught  shirking.    The  existence  of
imperfect capital markets, the possibility that firms will falsely claim  the  bond,  and  worker  risk
aversion are some of the reasons that could deter the existence of bonding schemes.iii)         Turnover              Model    
The labor turnover model assumes that turnover is costly to firms and therefore their wage
policy is used to economize on such costs (Salop, 1979, and Stiglitz, 1974, 1986).  The costs
could be direct expenditures, such as orientation programs, or indirect costs such as lower worker
productivity during an adjustment process, which are at least partially paid for by the firm.  This
model has a formal structure that is very similar to the shirking model.  In this case, a higher wage
than the market clearing level plays the role of reducing costly labor turnover.  Workers will be
more reluctant to quit the higher their relative wage (compared to the market wage) and the higher
the cost of being unemployed.
The bonding critique referred to in the shirking model also applies to the turnover model.
Salop (1979) assumes that there are restrictions to charging a fee to new applicants (which is an
alternative  to  wage  policy),  restrictions  that  arise  from  imperfect  capital  markets,  worker  risk
aversion or moral hazard problems.
Stiglitz (1974) has explained rural-urban wage differentials for LDCs in terms of a labor
turnover model.  The assumption is that turnover, hiring and training costs are higher in the urban
than in the rural sector, and that turnover is a function of wages.  Thus, a firm can reduce its
turnover rate by paying urban workers higher wages than those that prevail in rural areas.
iv)        Adverse            Selection              Model    
The  adverse  selection  model  is  based  on  four  assumptions:    first,  workers  are
heterogeneous in ability; second, job performance depends on worker ability; third, the firm has
imperfect information on worker characteristics (ability); and last, ability and worker  reservation
wages are positively correlated.  The model is set up under the assumption that better workers
have better alternative offers, where a relevant option is self-employment (Weiss, 1980).
The firm that offers higher wages attracts a better pool of applicants, and the quality mix of
those who quit their jobs is a function of relative wages.  Thus, firms that pay higher wages will be
able  to  achieve  higher  levels  of  productivity.    Similar  adverse  selection  models  to  the  one
described in Weiss (1980) are tested in Garen (1985) and Weiss and Landau (1984).
v)        Recruiting              Model    
In the recruiting model firms are concerned with the probability that their employment offer
will be accepted by the worker (Lang, 1988 and Montgomery, 1988).
The  assumptions  of  the  model  are  that  workers  may  hold  more  than  one  job  offer
simultaneously, that there is a delay between a firm’s offer and the time workers show up to work,
and that the firm does not know the alternative options available to workers.  In this situation it iscostly for the firm if its wage offer is turned down by the worker for three reasons:  first, the position
remains vacant longer and there are costs of forgone production; second, the firm may lose other
qualified applicants; and finally, there are new costs of evaluating further applicants.  Therefore,
firms that find vacancies more costly will offer higher wages.  Firms should choose a “strategy of
scale,” where high capital firms pay high wages and vice versa (Lang, 1988).
vi)        Sociological              or             Normative               Models     
While the previous EWMs were neoclassical in their assumption of individual maximization
by all agents, the sociological models, by contrast, emphasize social conventions that are not
completely individualistic (Solow, 1979 and 1980; Akerlof,  1982  and  1984;  and  Akerlof  and
Yellen, 1988).
In Akerlof’s partial gift exchange model (Akerlof, 1984) the firm raises worker effort by
paying the worker a wage above the going wage (giving a gift) and in reciprocity workers will work
harder than the minimum standard (a reciprocal gift).  Workers have a perception about their fair
wage that Akerlof models as a function of previous period wages, wages paid to other workers
who belong to the individual’s reference group, unemployment levels, and the individual’s work
rules.  They make a similar argument to predict the positive correlation between wages and profits.
The hypothesis is that worker morale, and therefore work effort, will be negatively affected by
“unfair” disparities between worker and firm earnings.6
There are two main implicit hypothesis in the sociological model that we would like to
highlight.
A first implicit assumption is the notion that in  most  occupations  workers  have  some
discretional power over their work.  As a consequence firms’ output does not depend only on the
number of workers employed but also on workers’ level of effort.  As has been stated by Akerlof
(1982) this could be also interpreted as a distinction between labor and labor power.
A second implicit notion is that the economic man is a social category (Solow, 1980).  The
recognition of the importance of social conventions and fairness considerations determines that
the effort function depends not only on workers’ own wages, but also on workers’ relative wages
(across workers) and workers’ past wages.  A worker’s perception of being unfairly treated with
respect to his/her coworkers influences his/her productivity.
vii)        Union             Threat               Model    
                                    
6  The importance of “fairness” considerations in economic decision has also been addressed
by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986).  They  survey  evidence  indicating  that  there  are
“community standards of fairness” that influence the behavior of firms and workers.Finally, let us note that the union threat model  developed  by  Dickens  (1986)  led  to
outcomes similar to EWMs.  The threat of collective action provides workers with bargaining power
that allows them to appropriate part of the firm’s rents.  In the case of a monopoly, rents are derived
from  the  firm’s  market  power  (monopoly  profits);  in  the  case  of  a  competitive  firm,  Dickens
assumes that in the short run workers will share the return from any firm’s fixed assets.  The model
predicts that unemployed workers will be unable to bid down the firm’s wages and that higher
wages  are  expected  in  sectors  with  low  organization  costs  and  high  potential  gains  from
unionization.
c)  Implications for Wage Differentials Analysis
As was stated before, one of the most important predictions of EWMs is the existence of
wage dispersion.  However, it must be noted that neither the competitive model nor most of the
EWMs can  explain  the  fact  that  firms  employing  different  technologies  coexist  in  the  same
industry.  In this sense, EWMs are able to explain only  the  existence  of  interindustrial  wage
differentials, but not intraindustry wage dispersion.7  Therefore, some external assumption  is
needed in order to generate intraindustry dispersion.  A solution used in the literature to obtain
heterogeneity among firms has been to assume that one factor of production has a flexible supply
to the industry but a fixed supply to the firm.8  Additionally, we may  consider  that  there  are
empirical problems that generate intraindustrial heterogeneity, i.e., we will observe some product
differentiation even if we are very careful in our empirical assessment of the industry.
EWMs also predict an association between wage premium and firm characteristics, where
the link between both sets of variables varies depending on the models.  In this sense, EWMs
provide a formalization for arguments found earlier in the literature about the influence of industrial
characteristics on wage dispersion.  Consider for example Lester’s monitoring hypothesis and
Stigler’s screening hypothesis, mentioned in Section 1.  In the rest of this section we will focus on
these links between EWMs and firm characteristics and the predictions of EWMs in terms of firm’s
wage behavior.
The nutritional model predicts that the efficiency wage for workers who are in excess
supply should be stable, that different wage agreements  should  exist  for  workers  employed
under long- vs. short-term contracts, and finally that we should observe a predominance of stable
long-term employment agreements (Rodgers, 1975 and Bliss and Stern, 1978).
                                    
7  An exception is the  recruiting  model  (Lang,  1988),  where  a  vector  of  capital  and  wage
combinations exists in equilibrium.
8  Oi (1983) demonstrates that, under the assumption that entrepreneurial ability is the specific
scarce input, an industry will contain heterogeneous  firms  that  will  differ  in  size  and  in  their
organization of production.The shirking model predicts higher wages in firms where monitoring costs are high and/or
where the cost of worker malfeasance is high.  Similarly the turnover model predicts higher wages
in firms where turnover is more costly.  In turn, there are different hypotheses that link these
efficiency wage costs with firm characteristics that can be measured.
Shirking/monitoring costs have been assumed to be higher in large firms.  Given that the
production process is more interdependent in large firms, any breakdown, slowdown, or industrial
accident will be more costly.    Additionally,  higher  wages  play  the  role  of  saving  monitoring-
entrepreneurial time, which has a higher opportunity cost in large firms.
In addition, shirking may also be associated with the capital endowment, in the sense that
it will be costly for firms that use expensive capital equipment (in the extreme shirking could be
associated with smashing the machines or stealing inputs or products).
Turnover costs have also been related to the size of the firm.  The hypothesis is that
recruiting and training costs are higher in large firms, owing to their more prescribed production
methods.  In this case, if firms share at least part of such costs they will have an incentive to reduce
turnover.
Screening costs are also higher in large firms.  Weiss and Landau (1984) formulate a
screening model in which wages determine the productivity of a firm’s best employees and the
number of applicants.  In this set up, they show that wages and firm size are positively correlated, a
result that is driven by the fact that large firms need more workers.  In Garen’s (1985) model large
firms  have  a  higher  cost  of  acquiring  information  about  workers.    Those  differences  in  the
screening process between large and small firms generate a positive relationship between firm
size and wages.  Both models seem to be supported by the author’s estimates.
The recruiting models predict a relationship amongst capital, profits, and wages.  This
relation could be extended to other EWMs under the canonical form of equation [5].  The intuition
is that any malfeasance that involves underutilization of capital and forgone production, such as a
higher rate of quitting and shirking, or lower recruiting, will be more costly in firms with high capital-
labor ratios, higher profits and a large labor force (Lang, 1988, p. 3).
In most EWMs workers are concerned with their own wage and their opportunity cost,
measured by an average wage and  the  unemployment  rate.    Under  the  sociological  model,
workers are also concerned with their relative wages inside the firm and their own past wages,
since these relative wages affect their perception of being fairly treated.
Both the union threat model and the sociological model predict higher wage premia in
sectors with high rents which, as in Dickens (1986), we can assume represent monopoly rents or
returns to fixed investments.  However, while in the first model worker pressure arises from the
threat of unionization, in the sociological model worker pressure arises from a morale effect that
influences productivity.Some caveats need to be made to the previous arguments.  In particular, large and capital
intensive firms should choose a technology that prevents the damage from shirking or that makes
monitoring easy.  However, considering the sum of arguments just discussed, we conclude that
EWMs create a presumption that higher wages should be expected in large firms with high capital
investments and high profits.  Additionally, the sociological model predicts that firms will tend to
pay high or low wages to all occupations.
3.  A Comment on Segmentation
Segmentation is a topic closely related to wage differentials, because one of the main
arguments of the segmented labor market (SLM) school is that the neoclassical model does not
provide an adequate explanation of the dispersion of wages and income.  SLM theory asserts that
differences in wages can be explained by the adscription of the labor force to different segments
of the labor market.
Moreover, most of the empirical tests on segmentation have  attempted  to  prove  the
hypothesis  that  wagesetting  mechanisms  differ  across  labor  market  segments,  and  there  is
rationing of primary or formal sector jobs.  Therefore, the existence of wage differentials across
labor market segments has been one of the empirical tests for segmentation.  However, in order
to relate segmentation to interindustrial wage differentials, we should argue that some industries
belong to the primary (or formal) sector while others belong to the secondary (or informal).
EWMs have tried to provide a rationalization for the existence of dual labor markets of the
type postulated by Doeringer and Piore (1971).  The hypothesis is that the primary sector  is
composed of efficiency wage firms while the wage-productivity relation is weak or non-existent for
secondary sector firms.9
In the LDCs’ case, it also has been argued that a key difference between formal and
informal sectors is the existence in the former of a wage efficiency relationship.  However this is a
more  controversial  assertion,  given  the  predominance  of  self-employed  inside  the  informal
sector.10
The analysis of the segmentation hypothesis goes far beyond the purpose of this paper.
Also data limitations prevents us from a further discussion of this point, since most of our data
excludes informal activities and we basically focus the analysis on the wage differences among
employees.  However large wage differentials prevail in the Chilean economy even after excluding
informal sector workers from the analysis.
                                    
9  See Bulow and Summers (1986).
10   See Mazumdar (1981).III.  THE EXISTENCE OF WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AND THEIR PATTERN
ACROSS TIME, FIRM SIZES, AND OCCUPATIONS
In the following pages we test the  statistical  significance  of  wage  differentials  across
industries  in  the  Chilean  economy  and  examine  their  pattern  across  time,  firm  size,  and
occupations.
We  rely  on  three  sources  of  data  on  workers’  industrial  wages:    (i)  manufacturing
censuses; (ii) employment household surveys; (iii) occupational wage surveys for selected large
firms.
The manufacturing censuses are conducted by the Instituto Nacional  de  Estadísticas
(INE).  They have the advantage of providing historical data, dating from 1937; however, their
information refers only to workers’ average wage and industry average characteristics.  Therefore it
does  not  allow  us  to  control  in  the  estimations  for  differences  among  individual  workers
characteristics.  The censuses have been conducted for 1937, 1957, 1967, and 1979.
The household survey of the Universidad de Chile presents information both on workers’
individual earnings and personal characteristics, such as age, education, etc.  The disadvantages
are related to the small sample size (near 3,000 observations) and the fact that it refers only to
Santiago.  We have information for 1969, 1978, and 1987.
Finally, we also have information for a sample of 86 “modern” and large firms.  They report
their wages along occupations and some characteristics of the firm.  This sample does not present
information on individual characteristics; however  the  very  detailed  occupational  classification
(more than one hundred occupations) allows  comparisons  between  workers  performing  very
similar jobs.
The three samples present useful information, despite the fact that none of them is an
“ideal” data source.  However in conjunction, they provide  useful  information  for  testing  the
EWMs and reaching a better understanding of the Chilean labor market.
1.  The Existence of Wage Differentials11
The importance of industry affiliation on worker’s wages is examined by  testing  wage
differentials across industries, taking into account differences in workers’ personal characteristics.
Wage differentials are estimated  from  a  standard  cross  section  wage  equation  that  includes
controls for worker education, age, sex, and occupation.  The estimated wage equation has the
form:
                                    
11  This methodology follows closely Krueger and Summers (1988).ln W = X a +  Y ß  +  [2]
where:
X is a matrix of worker characteristics
Y is a vector of industrial dummies.12
In order to get a more intuitive measure of the impact of industry affiliation on wages, the
estimated ß coefficients are normalized around the weighted mean, as follows:
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Wage differentials are represented by the vector  ßir and they indicate the proportional
difference in wages between the average worker in an industry and the weighted average of all
industries, controlling for differences in worker characteristics.
The standard deviation of ßir represents a measure of wage dispersion and needs to be
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where the variance is weighted by employment shares and   is the standard error of ßi.
Table 2 reports the estimated interindustrial wage differentials, for 1967, 1978, and 1987.
The statistical test (test F) indicates that interindustrial wage differentials are statistically significant,
after controlling for workers’ characteristics, i.e., all the estimations report statistically significant
jointly industrial dummies.  (The complete regression results are presented in the Appendix.)
TABLE 2
Industrial Wage Differentials: Santiago, Chile, 1969, 1978, and 1987a
                                    
12  Some of the coefficients are individually  statistically  significant  also.    However  the  small
sample size is a limitation for the industry individual analysis.1969 1978 1987
  Food, Drinks, and Tobacco -0.042 0.006 0.045
  Textiles, Apparel, and Leather -0.006 0.079 0.051
  Wood and Furniture -0.139 0.095 0.052
  Paper and Printing 0.207 0.161 0.150
  Chemical Products -0.099 0.193 0.097
  Non-Iron Metals and Basic Metallics 0.091 -0.032 0.043
  Fabricated Metals and Machinery 0.024 0.032 0.118
  Construction 0.013 0.104 0.118
  Wholesale Trade 0.202 0.209 0.108
  Retail Trade -0.238 -0.264 -0.170
  Restaurants and Hotels -0.114 -0.038 -0.136
  Public Administration 0.249 -0.284 -0.266
  Financial Service and Insurance 0.236 0.293 0.493
  Repair Service -0.063 -0.019 -0.025
  Laundries 0.179 0.028 -0.117
  Domestic Services -0.370 -0.059 -0.009
  Educational Services 0.034 -0.116 -0.083
  Health Services -0.114 -0.107 -0.167
  Other Services 0.051 0.070 -0.049
  Transport and Storage 0.021 0.137 0.090
  Public Utility Services 0.091 -0.050 0.257
Sample Size 2,667 2,708 2,598
Standard Deviationsb 0.114 0.141 0.154
a   The sample includes white and blue collar workers from the private and public sectors.
b  Standard deviations are weighted by employment shares; adjusted for sampling error.
Additionally, the results indicate that industry affiliation has a large impact on wages.  For
example,  in  1987  financial  service  institutions  workers  earned  49%  above  the  mean,  while
workers  in  retail  trade  earned  17%  below  the  average  wage,  after  controlling  for  individual
characteristics (see Table 2).
For the three years under analysis we find, among the high paying industries, workers
belonging to financial services and wholesale trade.  The lowest paying industries are retail trade
and restaurants and hotels.
The wage dispersion, as measured by the standard deviation ranges from 0.114 to 0.154
(see Table 2).  These results do not differ too much from the ones obtained for the US, opposing
the view that wage dispersion in LDCs should be lower.  Krueger and Summers’ (1988) report
standard deviations of interindustrial wage differentials in the range 0.11 to 0.14 for  different
years.  Moreover, the dispersion of the simple average wage (without human capital controls)
seems larger in Chile.  The standard deviation of the average wage (no-controls) across industriesis 0.29, 0.26 and 0.35 for the years 1969, 1978, and 1987.  The corresponding figure is 0.24 for
the US economy.13
The  previous  comparison  implies  that  adding  workers’  characteristics  to  the  wage
equation produces a larger drop in interindustry wage dispersion in the estimates for the Chilean
economy, a result that could be driven by the higher educational variance across industrial sectors
and the higher return to human capital that are generally present in LDCs.
2.  The Pattern of Wage Differentials across Time
After testing for the existence of significant wage differentials, we analyze the stability of
the wage structure through time.
Table 3 presents the correlations through time of the wage differentials estimated in the
previous section.
The results indicate a low correlation between the years 1969 and 1978, however a high
correlation between 1978 and 1987.  In order to further check this results we performed similar
estimations for a sample of private workers only.  In this case we obtained high correlations for
both periods.  Therefore the changes in the wage structure that we observe between 1969 and
1978 are mainly due to changes in the relative wages of public sector workers.  In the previous
table (table 2) it was possible to observe the drastic change in public servant wages.
TABLE 3
Intertemporal Correlation of Industry Wage Differentials: 1969-87
(Correlation Coefficients)
Public and Private Sectors           Private Sector
1969 1978 1987 1969 1978 1987
1969 1.000* 1.000*
1978 0.348 1.000* 0.915 1.000*
1987 0.376 0.959 1.000* 0.874 0.989 1.000*
*  The correlations are weighted by employment shares and adjusted for the sampling error.  This
adjustment causes some correlations to be greater than 1.
The public sector wage differential falls from 25% above the mean to 29% below the
mean between 1969 and 1987.  A similar but less dramatic change is also observed in educational
                                    
13  See Krueger and Summers (1987), Table 2.1.  They report standard deviations of 0.146 and
0.24 for the industrial wage differentials, with and without labor quality controls, respectively.services, which fall from 0.03% to -12%.  These results are associated with the decrease in the
government budget expenditure that took place during these years and the existence of public
emergency employment programs at very low wages.
The wage structure seems very similar the years 1978 and 1987.  The major difference for
the last period is the increase in wages in the financial service sector.  This sector, which is always
one of the highest paid, goes from 24% in 1969 to 29% in 1978 to 49% above the mean in 1987
(see table 2).
In order to perform a long-term comparison of the wage structure, we have to rely on data
from the manufacturing census.  In this case wage differentials simply represent the difference
between the average wage in an industry and the total weighted average wage.  Table 4 presents
the correlations of the average wage between 1937, 1957, 1967, and 1979.
The correlations for the last three years (1957, 1967, and 1979) ranged between 0.92
and 0.89.  Going back in time lowers the correlation to 0.60 between 1979 and 1937.  The results
indicate a stable wage structure, especially during the last two decades, an impressive fact given
the very different economic policies that were implemented during that period.  On the other
hand, the results seems to indicate that the wage structure was more affected by the process of
development than by changes in economic policies.  Let us remember that much of the industrial
development in Chile took place after the ’40s.  The correlation between 1937 and 1957 is 0.72
while the correlation between 1957 and 1979 is 0.92.14
TABLE 4
Industry Wage Structure through Time: Comparisons of Log Earnings in the
Manufacturing Sector, 1937-79 (Standard Deviation and Correlation
Coefficients)
Standard Deviation
of Log Average Wage   Weighted Correlations with 1979
Original Homogeneous       84       50       30
Year Classification Classification Industries Industries Industries
1979 0.398 0.393 1.000 1.000 1.000
 (84)  (30)  (84)  (50) (30)
1967 0.398 0.359 0.865 0.884 0.915
 (84)  (30)  (84)  (50) (30)
1957 0.356 0.318       - 0.871 0.917
 (57)  (30)       -  (50) (30)
1937 0.335 0.256       -      - 0.604
                                    
14  These correlations are lower than the ones obtained for the US for similar periods of time;
however the data present different levels of aggregation. (95)  (30)       -      - (30)
Note: The number of observations are in parentheses.
The correlations are weighted by 1979 employment shares.
It must also be pointed out that the correlations with 1937 are subject to a downward bias
owing to the fact that the data is not strictly comparable, since the census  of  1937  includes
establishments with fewer than five workers.
The analysis of the wage structure over time indicates a very stable pattern of relative
wages for the Chilean economy, an impressive result given the changes that this economy has
experienced during the period under examination.
Overall, the magnitude of the policy effects on wages seems very small.  The results
indicate that only very dramatic changes in policy—such as those in the Chilean public sector
case—have important  impacts  on  the  wage  structure.    The  fact  that  the  interindustry  wage
structure seems very stable across time implies that competitive explanations of wage differentials
based on the short-run immobility of labor or transitory labor demand shocks have a minor role, or
no role at all, in explaining such differentials.
The data on table 4 also indicate a high dispersion of wages in the manufacturing sector,
with standard deviations in the range of 0.34 to 0.40.  Similar results have been obtained for
Venezuela  and  Uruguay.    Data  from  the  Uruguay  manufacturing  census  indicates  that  the
weighted standard deviations range from 0.308 in 1982 to 0.353 in 1986 (Abuhadba, 1988).  In
the case of the manufacturing sector  in  Venezuela,  the  wage  dispersion  was  0.34  in  1985
(Márquez, 1988).
The dispersion of wage differentials seems high, compared with the international data
presented by Krueger and Summers (1987).  As in the previous section, our results tend to
contradict their hypothesis that developed countries have greater wage dispersion than LDCs,
owing to their higher level of human capital.
3.  The Pattern of Wage Differentials across Firm Sizes
Size  seems  to  have  a  more  significant  effect  on  wages  in  Chile.    Comparisons  of
interindustry average wages in the manufacturing census indicate that the pattern of correlation
differs across size.  In the case of Chile, the wage correlation between large and medium size firms
is 0.656; however there is no correlation between large and small firms, 0.084.15
                                    
15  The census firm strata are:  small, 5-9 workers; medium, 10-49 workers; large, 50 and more
workers.By contrast, in the US economy the industry wage structure is shown as highly correlated
across firm size, a correlation of 0.78 between small and large  firms  (Krueger  and  Summers,
1987).
We interpret these results as an indication of the greater intraindustrial heterogeneity of
LDCs.
4.  The Pattern of Wage Differentials across Occupations
One of the most interesting hypothesis to test is the stability of the  pattern  of  wage
differentials across occupations,  given  the  different  predictions  of  different  models  of  wage
determination in respect to this pattern.
In the first place, if wage differentials arise owing to unmeasured worker ability, then why
do industries that require highly skilled managers also require janitors with special abilities?  It is
difficult to argue in favor of a technology that requires such strong ability complementarities across
all occupations.  According to the competitive model, we should expect high correlations only
between occupations that are complementary in the firm’s production function.
Secondly, shirking, turnover, and screening theories predict that firms should pay high
wages only to those occupations where such costs are especially high.  A uniform correlations
pattern is to some extent also a challenge for these models.
A unique prediction of the sociological models is that firms will pay evenly high or low
relative wages to all their workers because norms, loyalty feelings, and fairness considerations
influence worker productivity.
In the Chilean case, the correlation of wage differentials between white and blue collar
workers across industries is 0.652, according to the data from the household survey of 1987.
The data from the manufacturing census indicate a growing correlation between white
and blue collar workers.  The correlation between blue and white collar workers was 0.128 in
1937; 0.523 in 1957; and 0.757 in 1967 and 1979.  One reason behind this tendency could be
the relative decline in the proportion of blue collar workers in the work force.16 The increase in
white collar workers has been accompanied by a change in their composition,  increasing  the
number  of  clerical  and  productive  white  collar  workers  compared  to  managerial  positions.
Nevertheless, the observed correlations indicate that the new white collar entrants were  paid
according to the relative wage level of existing employees.
                                    
16 It should be noticed that data from 1937 are less compatible with the surveys performed
thereafter.Overall, the results indicate that the wage structure is fairly uniform among blue and white
collar workers in the Chilean manufacturing sector, indicating a pattern of high- vs. low-paying
industries.
However, the data analyzed so far provide us only with highly aggregated occupational
categories.  In order to advance in the testing of the EWMs, we have to rely on a new set of data:
wage surveys for selected Chilean large firms.  There are two wage surveys:  an Administrative
Survey and a Productive Workers Survey, for March and October 1985 respectively.
The first thing worth noticing is that wages in  this  sample  are  much  higher  than  the
average wage in the economy, even for the lowest skilled occupations.  For example, during 1985
the minimum wage was 6,667 pesos while the average wage of this sample of unskilled workers
was 22,775 pesos monthly.  More recent data (from the same survey) indicate that in January
1989 the average wage for unskilled blue collar (in production) was 45,000 pesos and the lowest
wage in the sample was 22,500 pesos.  These figures are much higher than the minimum wage
(about 15,000).  It must also be noticed that the poverty line wage is estimated around 28,000
pesos.
The magnitude of the differentials between the legal minimum wage and the wage of low
skilled occupations in modern firms makes very difficult an explanation of these wage differentials
based on any “malfeasance.”  On the contrary, it makes more sense to hypothesize that “modern”
firms that require a stable, motivated, and productive labor force need to pay their workers a wage
that at least provides for their basic needs.  What is detrimental to this nutritional “basic needs”
argument is the high dispersion of wages in the lower ranked occupations.  The data show us that
even  inside  the  modern  sector  wage  dispersion  across  occupations  is  high;  the  standard
deviation ranges from 0.15 to 0.47.
Additionally, contrary to what is expected in a competitive model, we do not find higher
wage dispersion in the top ranked positions than in lower ones.  If wage differentials were due to
differential abilities, we should expect higher dispersion  in  occupations  where  differences  in
ability or other personal characteristics have a greater impact on productivity.  In this sense we
should expect high dispersion in occupations such as managers and chiefs of departments, for
example.  However, performing a simple correlation test we found that the wage dispersion is
negatively correlated with the  absolute  wage  level  in  the  Administrative  Survey  and  has  no
correlation at all in the Productive Survey.17  An explanation could be that firms set wages at the
bottom  of  the  occupational  ladder  more  imprecisely  when  there  are  few  workers  in  such
occupations.
                                    
17 The correlation coefficient between the standard deviation of wages and the average wage
for each occupation are -0.4 for the Administrative Survey and 0.0 for the Productive Survey.Tables 5 and 6 present the correlations for aggregated groups of Administrative Office
occupations and Productive Plant occupations, respectively.  We need to have in mind that the
sample size is small and that the number of observations across occupations varies, issues that
may influence the results.  However, we assert that the results are highly consistent even under
this limitation, and they provide a good estimation of the tendencies in the  pattern  of  wage-
occupation correlations.
Occupations that are likely to be complementary in production are highly correlated.  For
example, managers are more correlated with secretaries than with blue collar workers.  Chiefs of
departments are more correlated with professionals than with other categories.  But we also find
high wage correlations in occupations where such complementarity is hard to justify, for example
among blue collar workers, clerical workers, and secretaries (see table 5).TABLE 5
Correlations across Occupations: Administrative Survey
(Coefficient of Correlation)
Chiefs of Semi- and
Managers  Depart. Professional Clericals Secretaries Unskilled
Managers 1.000
  (80)
Chiefs of Department 0.480 1.000
  (77)   (84)
Professionals 0.289 0.761 1.000
  (59)   (64)   (64)
Clericals 0.308 0.488 0.440 1.000
  (62)   (66)   (52)   (68)
Secretaries 0.385 0.648 0.641 0.721 1.000
  (78)   (83)   (63)   (66)   (85)
Semi- and Unskilled 0.220 0.518 0.396 0.627 0.625 1.000
   workers   (61)   (67)   (54)   (54)   (67)   (68)
Note:  The number of observations is in parenthesis.
Similar evidence is provided in Table 6 for the sample of productive workers.  Overall this
matrix presents higher correlation coefficients than the Administrative Office sample.  The pattern
of high correlations between ‘likely’ complementary occupations is also observed in this sample.
For example first level chiefs are highly correlated with second level chiefs.  However, we also find
high correlations between occupations that are not related in production.  It is hard to see why a
firm that needs above average qualified clerical workers (the accounting department) also needs
above average productive workers.
A comparison among individual occupations yields similar results (see Romaguera, 1989).
Summarizing, the correlation analysis indicates that, as predicted  by  the  unmeasured
ability-competitive model, one explanation for the high wage correlations across occupations is
that  such  occupations  are  complementary  in  production.    However,  this  is  only  a  partial
explanation.  The results indicate that most of the occupations in a firm are  highly  correlated
among  themselves.    In  particular  all  of  the  nonprofessional  positions  are  highly  correlated,
independently of the specific function that they perform in the firm.  These occupations are not
related by technology but by the fact that workers share a physical location, establish contacts
among themselves, and have a more similar status.  In sum, the correlation results provide strongsupport for sociological models that predict that workers care about their relative wages; models
that emphasize the importance of norms in wage determination.
The fact that wages are highly correlated among occupations inside a firm also implies that
wages tend to move together across time, imposing some stickiness into the wage structure.
An examination of the wages of these large firms over the 1975-86 period helps us to
elucidate this point.  The fact that wages evolved similarly across firms occupations is made clear
from observing that unskilled workers followed the wage evolution of their managers much more
closely than the evolution of the minimum wage during the 1976-86 period (see graph 1).  The
wage correlations are 0.98 and 0.20 respectively.
IV.  WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AND INDUSTRY CHARACTERISTICS
The  existence  of  significant  wage  differentials  in  the  Chilean  economy  and  the
examination of their patterns across time and occupations was the subject of the previous section.
A pattern of high vs. low industries emerged from that analysis, where high (or low) industries are
the same for both blue and white collar workers and tend to remain stable over time.  The purpose
of  this  section  is  to  continue  this  line  of  inquiry  by  examining  the  industrial  characteristics
associated with high vs. low paying industries.
This  section  presents  estimations  of  industry  wage  correlates  for  the  Chilean
manufacturing sector.  The dependent variable is the average (log) wage in the industry.  As
independent variables we have data on five types of industry characteristics.  First, there is limited
information  on  average  worker  characteristics,  such  as  male-female  and  blue-white  collar
proportions, and average hours of work.  Second, there are several measures of capital intensity.
Information on capital has the limitation that it refers to the book value of plant and equipment and
exists only for 1957 and 1967.  We have added measures of physical capital, such as hp and kwh
and  fuel  consumption.    Third,  we  have  a  single  measure  of  growth,  represented  by  new
investment per firm.  Fourth, there are two measures of size, given by the number of workers and
the volume of sales.  Finally, measures of market power are given by two measures of profits:
profits per worker, and the ratio of profits to sales.  Profit is  traditionally  a  difficult  variable  to
measure and our variable definition—value added minus wages—is only an approximation.  We
have also included a measure of concentration for 1967.
The industrial characteristics show a high correlation among themselves.  The problem
that the high multicolinearity of industry attributes poses for studies of wage differentials  was
referred to before, in the literature review in Section I.  The sensitivity of the results to a particular
specification—a problem raised by Dickens and Katz—induces us to base our conclusions on theentire set of possible regressions.  Therefore, we followed their approach of testing different
specifications.
We tested several specifications of the wage equation as a way to partially cope with the
multicolinearity  that  exists  between  industry  characteristics.    The  difference  between  each
specification relates to the variable chosen to represent a specific industrial characteristic, i.e.,
how size, capital intensity, etc. are measured.  Thus, the equation includes a measure of size
(workers per firm or sales per firm), a measure of profitability (profits per worker or profits/sales),
and a measure of capital intensity (capital/labor, or hp per worker, or kwh per worker, or fuel per
worker).  The growth variable (investment per firm) was included as an alternative to measures of
capital intensity.  The equations also include controls for female/male composition, hours of work,
and blue/white collar ratio.  This gives us a total of 20 specifications for 1957 and 1967 and 12
specifications for 1979.18  We estimated the regressions separately for the whole sample  of
workers, for blue and white collar workers, and for the three years under analysis.  This gives a total
of 156 regressions.  Additionally we use information from an independent study on concentration
for 1967.19  In this case we regress again the 20 alternative  specifications,  now  adding  the
concentration variable.  This raises the total number of estimated equations to 216.
A summary of the complete set of regression results is  presented  in  Table  7,  which
describes the number of times the variable was positive or negative, and the number of times the
variable was statistically significant at 5%.  Some selected specifications are also presented in full
in Table 8.
The results are very consistent.  Most of the variables have the right sign and only one
variable with the wrong sign was significant.
However, the results seem sensitive to the particular manner of measuring the variables.
The better measure of firm size is the number of workers, while sales per firm has weaker and less
consistent  results.    In  terms  of  the  measures  of  profitability,  profits  per  worker  is  generally
significant,  while  the  ratio  profits/sales  shows  inconsistent  results  and  even  negative
(nonsignificant) signs.  We have employed four alternative measures of capital intensity.  Hp per
worker and kwh per worker are the variables that show a higher predictive power, performing
better than the alternative measure of physical capital (consumption of fuel per worker) and better
than the capital/labor ratio that reflects the monetary value of installed capital.
                                    
18 We do not have information on capital/labor ratio and HP per worker for this last year.
19 The information was obtained from Meller and Swinburn (1973) and provides information on
59 industries, which represent 70% of our sample.On  the  other  hand  we  note  that  the  results  are  also  sensitive  to  time  period  and
differences appear in the wage equation of white vs. blue collar workers.  For example, in 1957
the workers per firm variable is significant in 7 out of 10 specifications in the case of blue collar
workers, but it is not significant for white collar workers.  In 1967 the results for size and capital
intensity measures are similar between white and blue collar workers, while profitability is more
significant for white collar workers.  In 1967 we also included a measure of concentration, which
was highly significant only for blue collar workers.  The results for 1979 indicate that the variables
representing size and capital are more relevant for blue collar workers, while profitability has a high
influence on both groups of workers.
In sum, the results show that high paying industries have higher capital intensity, are more
profitable, have experienced greater growth in terms of capital investment, and have a higher
average size of firm.  Additionally, in spite of having data for only one year, concentration seems to
strongly affect the wages of blue collar workers.  These results are in line with the predictions of
EWMs, which—as discussed in Section II—make the presumption that higher wages should be
paid in large firms that employ expensive capital equipment and have high levels of profitability.
CONCLUSIONS
The implications of our results can be considered from two perspectives.  First, in terms of
the support or rejection that our analysis provides for different theories of wage differentials, and
in particular for the debate between competitive vs. efficiency wage theories.  Second, in terms of
what we have learned about the wage structure of LDCs, and in particular that of the Chilean
economy.
The basic prediction of efficiency wage models is the existence of wage differentials; in
this sense our results support such models.  However, the empirical analysis always has limitations
and ours is no exception.  The examination of the pattern of wage differentials provides additional
information for responding to the  question  of  whether  such  differentials  represent  merely  a
statistical phenomenon.
The research on the pattern of wage differentials reveals that they are relatively stable
across time and occupations.  Moreover, wage differentials are significantly correlated with the
characteristics of firms and industries.  The results show that high paying industries have higher
capital  intensity,  are  more  profitable,  have  experienced  greater  growth  in  terms  of  capital
investment, and have larger average size of firms.  Additionally, concentration seems to strongly
affect the wages of blue collar workers.
A  number  of  these  results  pose  serious  difficulties  for  a  competitive  hypothesis.
Interindustrial wage differentials are stable across time, including periods that involved importantchanges in economic policies.    Therefore,  competitive  explanations  based  on  the  short-run
immobility of labor or transitory demand shocks should have a  minor  role  or  no  role  at  all  in
explaining such differentials.  The high correlation of wage differentials across occupations is an
argument against the unmeasured ability explanation, since it is unlikely that workers in different
occupations within a firm or industry have similar quantities of unmeasured ability.
In terms of the correlates of industrial wage differentials, the results also fit better with the
prediction of the EWMs, but do not necessarily rule out the competitive hypothesis.  A significant
correlation between wages and capital intensity should be observed if high-ability technologies
are capital intensive and if the estimation  did  not  adequately  control  for  worker  ability.    The
significance of profits suggest the existence of rent-sharing processes that are more difficult to
reconcile with a competitive explanation
One of the results that poses more questions for a competitive hypothesis is the behavior
of modern firms during the 1975-86 period.  The results show that modern  firms  pay  wages
substantially higher that what seems to be the opportunity cost of workers.  The dispersion of
wages is not only high in the high-skilled  occupations  (where  unmeasured  ability  should  be
greater) but also in the semi- and unskilled occupations.  Wages are highly correlated between
occupations that are not complementary in production, and wages for different occupations show
a similar evolution across time.
The  addition  of  this  evidence  makes  very  implausible  the  argument  that  the  wage
differentials observed in the Chilean economy  respond  to  the  effect  of  unmeasured  worker
variables.  The results suggest, on the contrary, that industries and firms do in fact pay different
wages to similar workers.
There are still other arguments that can explain the existence of “real” wage differentials
without challenging the competitive hypothesis:  the existence of imperfections or rigidities that
prevent the adjustment of the labor market.  In the Chilean case the arguments have been based
on the existence of unions and the existence of indexation.  Our research indicates that it is
difficult to attribute to such factors the persistent pattern of wage differentials that we observe for
the whole period 1937-87.  In the previous sections we have suggested several arguments for
why this is so; here  let  us  only  remember  that  the  influence  of  unions  and  the  policies  of
indexation  have  changed  greatly  during  the  period  covered  by  our  analysis,  yet  the  wage
differentials have remained stable.
In short, the existence of wage differentials and  the  stability  of  their  pattern  is  more
consistent with EWMs that predict  such  behavior.    The  examination  of  the  pattern  of  wage
differentials also provides a test for the predictions of different EWMs.  However it is difficult to
discriminate among different EWMs.The importance of size and capital intensity in wage determination are factors that are
consistent with shirking and turnover models.  The problem with these findings is that alternative
explanations  can  also  be  provided.    In  particular,  the  argument  that  unmeasured  ability  is
correlated with technology makes it very difficult to discriminate among alternative hypotheses.
The high correlation across occupations poses  a  challenge  to  shirking  or  monitoring
models because firms should pay high wages only to the occupations where such  costs  are
particularly high.
The most consistent results are obtained for normative or sociological models that predict
a pattern of high correlations across all occupations inside a firm.  The evidence of rent-sharing
processes even when union power is weak is also consistent with this model.  Also, rent-sharing
arguments  could  be  combined  with  other  EWMs.    Overall,  the  Chilean  evidence  on  wage
differentials seems better explained by a combination of models that include both economic and
sociological arguments in order to explain the persistent pattern of such differentials.   In  this
sense, our results confirm the conclusions that have been obtained for the US economy:  firms
tend to pay higher wages to some occupations, owing to turnover, effort elicitation, recruitment or
other reasons, but at the same time they also face equity constraints that lead them to pay high
wages to all the other occupations.20
One of the main predictions of the EWMs is that wages will tend to be sticky.  Therefore, if
efficiency wage considerations are applicable to the Chilean economy—as this investigation has
attempted to prove—a pattern of sticky wages in the Chilean economy should also be predicted.
The behavior of wages in modern firms during the 1975-1986 period support such hypothesis.
Finally, with respect to LDCs’ wage structures, contrary to what was assumed by other
researchers, we found a higher dispersion of interindustrial wages in Chile compared with the US
manufacturing sector.  Nor is there a pattern of decrease of these differentials with higher levels of
development.  We interpret several  of  our  results  as  a  reflection  of  a  more  heterogeneous
industrial structure in LDCs than in developed countries.
                                    
20  See Katz (1988).Bibliography
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Review of Selected Wage Differentials—Wage Determination Studies in Latin America
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Author and Country Data Relevant Conclusions
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Ferreira da Silva (1987) Relacao Anual de Informacoes Sociais The study analyzes the influence on wage differentials of four
Brasil (RAIS), 1977 and Imposto de Renda groups of variables: individual, firm, industrial, and regional.
de Pessoas Juridicas (IRPJ), 1978. Firm size, profits, concentration, union power, and minimum
Sample of 46,531 workers in regional wage, almost always have a positive and significant
manufacturing industries. effect on wages.  The results for profits and concentration
Dependent variable is monthly depend on the specification.  Worker characteristics explain
individual wage (linear and log). the bulk of individual wage variation: 80%-86% of the sum of
  the beta coefficients.
Macedo, Roberto (1985) Sample from RAIS, Relacao Anual de  The study shows that wages in state firms exceed those paid
Brazil Informacoes Sociais, (RAIS) 1981. by private firms.  The results hold even when controls for worker
The initial sample includes 335,000 characteristics are included.  Public-private wage differential is
workers.  One private and one public decomposed.between a portion attributable to worker
enterprise are selected from that  characteristics and a surplus.  The wage differentials attributed
sample for further analysis (n= 1204). to surplus ranged from 26% to 83%, depending on the wage
structure selected as the norm (public or private).
Reyes Heroles (1984) Household Survey, 1977 and The study asserts that the modernization of Mexican industry
Mexico Industrial Census, 1975. changed the industry distribution of earnings: average earnings
Dependent variable is the monthly are higher and the variance of interindustry earnings was
average wage in 23 manufacturing reduced.  Modernization is measured through variables related
industries, and moments from the to technology: as capital per worker, average size of
earning distribution. establishment, and specialization ratio on production.
Corbo and Stelcner (1983) Employment and Unemployment This study tests the competitiveness of the labor market and
Chile. Survey, Universidad de Chile, 1978. the relevance of the H-C model in explaining individual
Dependent variable is log of individual  variations in earnings.  They test for structural differences in the
earnings.  Sample size = 1788. earnings functions of 9 industrial sectors (Chow test), finding no
evidence of segmentation and concluding that their results are
a validation of the H-C approach.TABLE 1 (Cont.)
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Author and Country Data Relevant Conclusions
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Salazar-Carrillo (1982) ECIEL specially designed survey.  It  Estimate wage equations using as independent variables:
11 Latin American  covered 9 manufacturing industries.  In  education, experience and degree of responsibility.  The study
countries each industry between 9-3 firms were  estimates wage rankings across countries, normalize for
surveyed, and for each firm approximately  differences in H-C.  They observe wide wage and interskill
20 occupations were selected.  They  differences within the region.  The study found no strong firm
surveyed 361 firms.  The dependent  size effect on wage differentials.
variable is individual worker earnings.
Castello Branco (1979) Data from the Labor Ministry : 1969 and  The main purpose of the study is to estimate H-C models.They
Brazil 1973.  The sample size is 70,000 for the obtain an R2 around 40% and important differences in H-C
estimation of a standard H-C model and return are observed across industries.  Equations with the
the dependent variable is the log of industrial average wage as dependent variable are also
individual wages. estimated.  An index of machine imports and the degree of
The study also estimates wage equations concentration has positive and significant effect on wages,
with industrial characteristics as  while output increase is positive but not significant and tariff
explanatory variables.  The dependent protection is negative and not significant.  Concentration,
variable is the log of the average wage  output and technology explained 31% of changes in
for 18 industrial sectors. average wage (1969-73).
Souza and Tokman (1978) Data from Household Surveys from They study the existence of segmentation in the labor market.
Dominican Republic,  Dominican Republic, Paraguay and Using a two-step regression, they regress the residuals of an
Paraguay and Salvador. Salvador. earning equation against occupation, industrial sector and
size of firm variables.  They found that these variables explain
nearly 25% of residual wages after controlling for H-C factors.
Workers with similar characteristics earn 40% more in the
formal than in the informal sector.
Fields and Marulanda Data for five manufacturing industries  They found higher wages in sectors with higher value added
(1976)—Colombia. (2 digit - SIC), 1967.  Dependent variable  per worker, more capital intensity, with larger firms, high foreign
is the average industrial wage. investment and a high proportion of white collar workers.